Robyn Lynn Sneddon v. John Wenkel and Robert Wenkel and Robert Graham : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Robyn Lynn Sneddon v. John Wenkel and Robert
Wenkel and Robert Graham : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul M. Belnap; Brett B. Pearce; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
Erik M. Ward; Christopher L. Shaw; Gridley, Echard and Ward; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





5A°IO l q | cW i^ 
DOCKET NO L L ^ T - ^ 
V^A^ 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 




P r i o r i t y No. 16 
91-0418-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Court Judge 
ERIK M. WARD (3380) 
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW (4407) 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Robyn Lynn Sneddon 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
PAUL M. BELNAP (0279) 
BRETT B. PEARCE (5220) 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, 
Robert Graham 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 




IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN WENKEL AND ROBERT 
GRAHAM, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appeal No. 900193 
Priority No* 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Second Judicial District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Court Judge 
ERIK M. WARD (3380) 
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW (4407) 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Robyn Lynn Sneddon 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
PAUL M. BELNAP (0279) 
BRETT B. PEARCE (5220) 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, 
Robert Graham 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i - iii 
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
COURSE OF PROCEDURES 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 4 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
I. THE BROAD LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF UTAH'S 
DRAM SHOP ACT CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE 
ACT IS INTENDED TO APPLY TO SOCIAL HOSTS 5 
II. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF UTAH'S 
DRAM SHOP ACT TO SOCIAL HOSTS SINCE THE 
ACT IS REMEDIAL IN NATURE 9 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINITFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO ADD A 
COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION 11 
CONCLUSION 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH CASE LAW 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 34, 
763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988). 7, 8, 14 
Baxtrum Family Ltd Partnership v. Hall, 
751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1988) 12 
GGA, Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 
(Utah App. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
i 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 
679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) . . . . . . . . 9 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988) . 8 
Lewis v. Maultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981). . 13 
Lucky 7 Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 
(Utah App. 1988) 1 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984) 12 
State v. Archiletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 
(Utah 1974) 9 
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. 
Utah Power & Light Company, 776 P.2d 632 
(Utah App. 1989) 1 
OTHER CASE LAW 
Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 18 
(Mass. 1967) 14 
Calligan v. Cousar, 187 N..E.2d 292 
(111. 1963) 14 
Lewis v. State of Iowa, 256 N.W. 181 
(Iowa 1977) . 10 
Martin v. Watts, 508 So.2d 1136 (1987 Alabama) 10 
Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. App. 1968) 13 
Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1 (NJ 1959). . 14 
Trail v. Christian, 213 N.W.2d 618 
(Minn. 1973). . . . . . . 14 
Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972) 9 
STATUTES 
Section 78-2-2(3 ) (j ), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) 1 
ii 
Section 32A-14-1 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) 1, 
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 
(1986 amendment). . 
Section 32-11-1, Utah Code Annotated. . . . . 
Section 32-11-1, Utah Code Annotated 
repealed 1985 
Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24, 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 32A-14-101, 1990 amendment, Utah 
Code Annotated 
Section 32A-11-1, Utah Code Annotated 
repealed 1985 
Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, repealed 1985 
Section 32-14-1 Utah Code Annotated, amended 1986 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . 




This Appeal is filed pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that the 
Utah Dram Shop Act (Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended)) applies only to commercial hosts in a commercial setting 
and does not apply to a social host supplying alcoholic beverages 
in a social setting? 
Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend Complaint by ruling there is no common law action in favor 
of an injured person against an individual supplier of alcohol? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant, and denial of the plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Complaint, the appellate court must liberally construe facts and 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, and is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions, since the court's summary judgment and denial of 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend were granted as a matter of law. GGA, 
Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989); Lucky 7 Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988); Utah State Coalition 
of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Company, 776 P.2d 632 
(Utah App.- 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rules 15 and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure- Section 
32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). A reproduction 
of the entire statute and applicable rules is contained in the 
addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose out of an automobile accident occurring on 
April 26, 1986, wherein the plaintiff was injured as a result of 
defendant Graham's vehicle colliding with her vehicle while the 
plaintiff was parked in her own driveway. Prior to the collision, 
Graham and Wenkel had been consuming beer at Graham's residence 
during the course of the evening. 
Defendants Graham and Wenkel, worked together at Hill Air 
Force Base and on the night in question stopped at a local 
convenience store on their way to Graham's home where each 
purchased his favorite brand of beer. At Graham's home, Wenkel 
consumed all of the beer that he purchased. Graham then offered 
Wenkel more beer which Wenkel proceeded to consume while at 
Graham's home. 
At approximately 8:00 a.m., the following morning, Wenkel left 
the Graham home to drive to his own residence. In route, Wenkel's 
vehicle jumped the curb near the plaintiff's home, and crashed into 
the plaintiff while the plaintiff was seated in the vehicle in her 
own driveway. Wenkel's blood alcohol content at the time of the 
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accident was .19% by weight. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court of 
Weber County, wherein the court granted defendant Graham's Motion 
for Summary Judgment ruling that the Utah Dram Shop Act as 
contained in Section 32A-14-1 does not apply in a social setting, 
and was intended to apply only to the commercial sale of alcoholic 
beverages. (R. 175). The summary judgment was entered on 
September 28, 1989. On November 21, 1989, the plaintiff filed a 
motion to amend her complaint seeking to add a common law 
negligence action against defendant Graham. The case against co-
defendant Wenkel was still pending at the time plaintiff moved to 
amend her complaint. (R. 181). 
The summary judgment in favor of the defendant Graham did not 
become a final order of the court until the court entered its order 
denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint on April 16, 1990. 
In fact, an appeal of the court's summary judgment was initially 
filed on October 25, 1989. (R. 177). On December 20, 1989, 
defendant moved the Supreme Court for an order dismissing the 
appeal for the reason that the action against co-defendant, Wenkel, 
was still pending at the time of the initial appeal. (R. 211-213, 
218-219). Subsequent to the October 25, 1989, Notice of Appeal, 
the Supreme Court, on stipulation of counsel, remanded the appeal 
to the trial court for the purpose of deciding the Plaintiff's 
pending Motion to Amend Complaint in order to obtain a final order 
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from the trial court. (R. 218). During the above-described 
sequence of procedural events, the case against co-defendant, 
Wenkel, had been settled, but was not dismissed by the trial court 
until February 14, 1990, pursuant to stipulation of counsel. (R. 
237-239). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah's Dram Shop Act applies to social hosts supplying 
alcoholic beverages in a social setting. The language of Utah's 
Dram Shop Act and its history indicate that the act is intended to 
apply to social hosts. The Dram Shop Act is intended to regulate 
any violation of the act in the providing of alcoholic beverages 
to persons who, as a result of their intoxication, cause injury to 
others. The statute is not strictly limited to the commercial sale 
or distribution of alcohol. 
Public policy supports the application of Utah's Dram Shop Act 
to social hosts since the act is remedial in nature. The clear 
intent of the Dram Shop Act is to provide third persons with a 
remedy for injuries sustained as a result of the misuse or abuse 
of alcohol, and to impose responsibility on those persons who 
provide alcohol in violation of the statute. Limiting the 
application of the Dram Shop Act to the commercial setting is to 
completely disregard the remedial nature of the statute and the 
statute's clear intent. 
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Complaint to add a common law negligence action against defendant 
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Graham since the trend supports such an action and since amending 
the complaint would not have prejudiced the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BROAD LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT 
CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE ACT IS INTENDED TO APPLY 
TO SOCIAL HOSTS 
Utah's original Dram Shop Act, formerly 32-11-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, provided: 
[A]ny person who gives, sells, or otherwise provides 
intoxicating liquor to another contrary to . . . Section 
32-7-14 or Section 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby causes 
the intoxication of another person, is liable for 
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any 
third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of that 
third person, resulting from the intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in 
subsection (1) of this section shall have a cause of 
action against the intoxicated person and the person 
who provided the intoxicating liquor in violation of 
subsection (1) above or either of them. 
Defendant is wrong in his assertion that the history of the 
act contains no mention of any regulation of the dispensing of 
alcohol in a social setting, given the context of the former 
statute prohibiting violations of Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24. 
At the time the original dram shop statute was enacted, 
Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24 of the Utah Code regulated not only 
sale and distribution of alcohol but also its possession and use. 
Section 32-7-14 provided that "no person shall sell or supply any 
alcoholic beverage or permit alcoholic beverages to be sold or 
supplied to any person under or apparently under the influence of 
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alcohol". Section 32-7-24 provided that "no person shall: (a) 
permit drunkenness to take place in any house or on any premises 
of which he is the owner, tenant, or occupant; or (b) permit or 
suffer any person apparently under the influence of liquor to 
consume any liquor in any house or on any premises of which the 
first named person is the owner, tenant, or occupant; or (c) give 
any liquor to any person apparently under the influence of liquor". 
The obvious intent of the original Dram Shop Act (Section 32-
11-1, Utah Code Annotated) was to regulate any violation of 
Sections 32-7-14 or 32-7-24, which, in turn, regulated not only 
the sale and distribution, but the possession and use of alcohol 
in a social setting. 
The present Dram Shop Act, originally enacted in 1985 and 
subsequently amended, uses essentially the same language when 
imposing liability upon individuals who violate the provisions of 
the act. Rather than refer specifically to other statutory 
references, such as the former Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24, the 
statute in effect at the time of the court's summary judgment 
provided: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing 
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to 
a person: 
(a) who is under the age of twenty-one (21) 
years, or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs, or 
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(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic 
beverage knew or should have known from the 
circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs, or 
(d) who is a known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that 
person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or 
means of support to any third person, or to the spouse, 
child, or parent of that third person resulting from the 
intoxication. An employer is liable for the actions of 
its employees in violation of this chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under 
subsection (1) has a cause of action against the person 
who provided the liquor or alcoholic beverage in 
violation of subsection (1). (Section 32A-14-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1986). 
In comparing the present statute with the former, the clear 
language of the Act indicates that it applies to social hosts. 
The only substantive changes in the statute relate to the inclusion 
of a broader definition of intoxicating liquor to include "any 
alcoholic beverage," and a stylistic change by including the 
prohibited acts in the statute itself, rather than referring to 
other statutes relating to the possession and use of alcohol. 
(Compare Section 32-11-1; Section 32A-14-1, 1986 amendment; 32A-
14-101, 1990 amendment). The amendment broadening the definition 
of intoxicating liquor to include "any alcoholic beverage" was 
effective on March 17, 1986, more than thirty (30) days before the 
April 26, 1986, accident giving rise to this law suit. 
In Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 34, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1988), a case involving the application of Utah's previous Dram 
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Shop Act (Utah Code Annotated Section 32-11-1, repealed 1985), the 
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the former Dram 
Shop Act applied to a provider of light beer, when the plain 
language of the statute only held that providers of "intoxicating 
liquors" could be liable for injuries to persons caused by one 
under the influence. In Allisen, the plaintiff was struck by a 
vehicle while crossing a street within minutes after the driver had 
left the American Legion premises. The American Legion filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Dram Shop Act 
did not apply to the sale and consumption of light beer. The trial 
court denied the American Legion's motion to dismiss, but on appeal 
this court ruled that since the Liquor Control Act in effect at the 
time (Utah Code Annotated Section 32-1-3, repealed 1985) 
specifically excluded light beer from its definition of liquor, the 
former Utah Dram Shop Act did not apply to providers of light beer. 
Id. at 809. 
The Allisen court further held that "where statutory language 
is plain and unambiguous, this court will not look beyond to define 
legislative intent." The Allisen court cited Johnson v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988), in ruling that the 
Supreme Court is guided by the rule that a statute should be 
construed according to its plain language. Allisen at 809. 
In construing the plain language of the Dram Shop Act in 
effect at the time of the accident giving rise to the present case, 
it is clear that the Act did not limit its application to the 
8 
commercial setting. The plain language of the statute provided: 
"Any person who directly gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing 
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to 
a person [in violation of the statute] and by those 
actions causes the intoxication of that person, is 
liable for injuries . . . to any third person . . . 
resulting from the intoxication. (Section 32-14-1 Utah 
Code Ann. 1986 amend., emphasis added). 
Clearly, the "any person" language of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous and must be construed to apply to the social, as well 
as, the commercial setting. Had the legislature intended that the 
statute only apply to the commercial setting, the plain language 
of the statute should have excluded the term "any person" and 
included terms such as "seller", "commercial distributor or 
provider", "tavern", or such other terms strictly designed to limit 
the application of the act to the commercial setting. This court 
has previously held that the best indicator of legislative intent 
is the statute's plain language, and that in the absence of 
ambiguity there is nothing to construe. See Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Archiletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974). Clearly, there is 
nothing ambiguous in the language of the 1986 Dram Shop Act. The 
term "any person" must, therefore, be broadly construed to include 
social hosts as well as commercial providers of alcohol. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT 
TO SOCIAL HOSTS SINCE THE ACT IS REMEDIAL IN NATURE 
In Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (1972 Iowa), 
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overruled on other grounds; Lewis v. State of Iowa, 256 N.W. 181, 
(1977 Iowa), the Iowa Supreme Court refused to hold that the Dram 
Shop Act applied only to those engaged in liquor traffic or sales. 
The court ruled that such statutes were remedial or compensatory 
in nature and, therefore, refused to adopt rules of strict 
construction which would limit the statute's scope and thus impair 
the remedy and advance the mischief sought to be corrected. 
Other jurisdictions whose Dram Shop Acts contain similar 
language to that contained in the Utah statute have ruled that dram 
shop liability extends to the social host. In Martin v. Watts, 508 
So.2d 1136 (1987 Alabama), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a 
statute which granted a person injured by an intoxicated person a 
right of action against the person who provided the intoxicant in 
violation of state law provided a cause of action against the 
social host for injuries received as a result of an automobile 
accident. The court rejected the social host's contentions that 
the statute applied only to commercial dispensers of alcohol since 
the statute included the terms "giving" and "otherwise disposing 
of." The court further held*that it was hard to imagine a phrase 
more expansive than "otherwise disposing of". 
The Martin court also noted that the trend in recent decisions 
of other jurisdictions was to allow causes of action where adults 
had assisted in furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors. Id. at 
1141. This same rationale justifies application of the Utah Dram 
Shop Act to social hosts, given the similarity of the terminology 
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since the Utah Act imposes liability on any person who "gives" or 
"otherwise provides" alcohol in violation of the statute. 
The clear intent of Dram Shop liability is twofold: (1) 
provide a remedy to innocent third persons who suffer injury as a 
result of the misuse and abuse of alcohol, and (2) impose some 
responsibility on those persons who provide alcohol to individuals 
in violation of the statute. To say that social hosts should not 
be held liable for irresponsibly providing alcohol to guests whom 
they know, or should know, are under the influence of alcohol is 
to completely disregard the remedial nature of the statute. 
POINT 111 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO ADD A COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a 
party may amend his pleading only upon obtaining leave of the court 
or by written consent of the adverse party. Rule 15 further 
provides that "leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." At the time the plaintiff filed its original motion to 
amend, the case against co-defendant, Wenkel, was still pending; 
and, therefore, the court's summary judgment was not final. (R. 
181, 237-239). Plaintiff's initial appeal was remanded to the 
district court for purposes of deciding plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Complaint. (R. 210-213, 218-220). The court issued its order 
denying plaintiff's motion ruling that "if it is deemed appropriate 
at the procedural juncture of this case to move to amend the 
complaint, the court is of the opinion that there is not a common 
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law cause of action running in favor of a person injured against 
a person who supplied alcohol . . . ". (R. 249). While the trial 
court's order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is less 
than clear, it appears on its face that the trial court denied 
plaintiff's motion because the court was of the opinion there is 
no common law action in favor of a injured person against a third 
party supplier of alcohol. 
Since the original case was still pending at the time 
plaintiff filed its original Motion to Amend, and was not dismissed 
until February 14, 1990, none of the court's orders were final for 
purposes of an appeal. Baxtrum Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 
751 P. 2d 1157 (Utah App. 1988), Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, 
or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express determination by 
the court that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon express direction for the entry of judgment. In 
the absence of such determination and direction, any 
order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties 
shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims 
or parties, and the order or other form of decision is 
subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all parties. 
At the time of the plaintiff's initial appeal, defendant 
Graham moved the Supreme Court for an order dismissing the original 
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appeal for the reason that the case involved multiple parties, and, 
therefore, required certification of finality pursuant to Rule 
54(b). Given the language of Rule 54, it is difficult to imagine 
how the courtfs .order of summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Graham may be deemed a final judgment prohibiting the plaintiff 
from amending its complaint to add a common law cause of action. 
In considering motions to amend pleadings, this court has 
ruled that determining factors include: (1) lack of prejudice to 
either party; and (2) whether the amendments were attempted prior 
to trial. Lewis v. Maultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981). Given the 
procedural posture of the case at the time plaintiff moved to 
amend, there would have been no prejudice to the defendants in 
allowing the amendment since the case had not yet gone to trial. 
This being the case, there is no procedural reason upon which the 
court's denial of plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint may be 
based. 
Since there Is no procedural basis for the denial of 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, it must be assumed that the 
court has denied the plaintiff's Motion to Amend by ruling as a 
matter of law that there is no common law cause of action in favor 
of an injured person against a third party supplier of alcohol. 
Contrary to the trial court's finding, a common law action for 
negligent serving of alcohol is recognized in many states. 
In Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. App. 1968), the 
Kentucky court of appeals held that an injured motorist had a valid 
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cause of action against a liquor store for negligently serving 
alcohol to a minor. In Rappaporfc v. Nichols,, 156 A. 2d 1 (NJ 1959), 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a plaintiff could state 
a negligence action for wrongful death against a bar which 
negligently served alcohol to a minor who was involved in an 
automobile accident that resulted in the death of the plaintiff's 
decedent. Likewise, in Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 
18, (Mass. 1967), the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized a 
common law negligence action against a bar that supplied alcohol 
to a motorist who was later involved in an accident injuring the 
plaintiff. See also, Trail v. Christian, 213 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 
1973), Calligan v. Cousar, 187 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1963). 
While the Utah Supreme Court has expressly refused to rule 
whether there is a common law action for the negligent supply of 
liquor, the modern trend suggests that an action ought to be 
recognized. Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1988). Preventing the destruction caused by intoxicated 
drivers, and providing injured plaintiffs with adequate means of 
redress against those who negligently supply or serve alcohol must 
be a major consideration for the court in determining whether a 
common law action for negligence ought to be recognized in Utah. 
In light of the fact that other states have recognized such common 
law causes of action in an effort to curb the effects of 
intoxicated drivers, this court should expressly adopt a negligence 




Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant Graham on the 
issue of the Dram Shop Act's application to social hosts. 
Plaintiff further requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to 
allow plaintiff to add a common law negligence cause of action 
against defendant Graham. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (Q day of August, 1990. 
/ • * / 
ERIK M. WARD 
IM. 
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
[p day of August, 1990, to Paul N. Belnap and Brett G. Pearce, 
attorneys for defendant Graham, at Strong & Hanni, Sixth Floor 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
HL 
ERIK M. WARD 
m. 
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Section 32A-14-101, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale 
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages — 
Injured person's cause of action against intoxi-
cated person or persons who provided alco-
holic beverage — Survival of action. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or 
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, 
to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or 
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or 
(d) who is a known interdicted person, 
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for 
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to 
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxica-
tion,, An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of 
this chapter. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic bever-
age in violation of Subsection (1). 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the 
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that 
person's estate. 
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person 
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the 
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate 
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one 
occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which 
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within 
two years after the date of the hyury. 
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the iiyury. 
History; C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L. beginning; in Subsection (2), inserted "or 
1985, che 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3. other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- stylistic changes, 
ment, effective March 17, 1986, added the Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effec-
language in Subsection (1) following "or oth- tive date of this subsection," referred to in 
erwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a) Subsections (4) and (5), appears in Laws 
through (lXd). the last sentence in Subsec-
 1 9 8 6 f c L 177f § 3f w h i c h b e c a m e effec t ive 
tion (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); in- March 17 1986. 
serted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the 
32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action — 
Statute of limitations — Employee protections. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the 
following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, 
is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from 
the intoxication: 
(a) any person under the age of 21 years; 
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; 
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage 
knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or 
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person. 
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this 
chapter. 
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's es-
tate. 
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursu-
ant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is 
limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all 
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be 
commenced within two years after the date of the injury. 
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon 
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise 
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a 
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judg-
ment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee 
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection 
(1). 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on 
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated 
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set 
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, } 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989, 
ch. 240, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch. 23, 
i 178. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec-
tion (7) and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1990 amendment, effective February 21, 
1990, renumbered this section, which formerly 
appeared as § 32A-14-1; transferred the lan-
guage after "to the following persons" at the 
end of the introductory paragraph in Subsec-
tion (1) from Subsection (l)(d); designated the 
former final sentence in Subsection (l)(d) as 
present Subsection (2); designated former Sub-
sections (2) to (7) as present Subsections (3) to 
(8); deleted "liquor or other* before "alcoholic 
beverage" in present Subsection (3); substi-
tuted "July 1, 1985" for "the effective date of 
this subsection" in present Subsection (5); de-
leted "which arises after the effective date of 
this subsection" after "chapter" in present Sub-
section (6); substituted "airport lounge, private 
club, on-premise beer retailer, or any other es-
tablishment" for "club, or any other facility" in 
present Subsection (8)(a); and made changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised-in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Rule 54, Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the -court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the cJourt that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WENKEL and 
ROBERT GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
The parties agree that for purposes of this motion, the 
conduct complained of arose in a social as opposed to a 
commercial setting. 
The Court is persuaded that the statute in question is 
not intended to apply in a social setting and accordingly grants 
defendant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this A/J6 day of September, 1989. 
t RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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I hereby certify that on the ^lgtt~ day of September, 
1989 I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to 
counsel as follows: 
Erik M. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 Twenty Fifth,Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Lynn S. Davies 
Attorney for Defendant Wenkel 
Key Bank Tower Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Paul M. Belnap 
Attorney for Defendant Graham 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 




Civil No. 99559 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the 
defendant Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court 
having reviewed the memoranda submitted in support of the motion 
and in opposition to the motion, and having issued its Memorandum 
Decision determining that the statutes in question were not 
intended to apply in a social setting as found in this case, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant 
Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that 
the plaintiff's complaint against Robert Graham is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant Graham. 
DATED t h i s J day of Af^\^SLg jJkJLA^  , 1989 
BY THE COURT: 
M-, Stanton M, Taylor 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^S7^ day of /&£/*-# 0j/
 9 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Erik M. Ward 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
P. 0. BOX 1850 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 




Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
Brett G. Pearce, #5220 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Robert Graham 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 




Civil NO. 870999559 
Judge Stanton Taylor 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 12th 
day of March, 1990, at the hour of 10:45 A.M. before the 
Honorable Stanton Taylor, District Court Judge, on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend complaint. 
The plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record 
and defendant Robert Graham was represented by his counsel of 
record. 
The court having previously granted Defendant's Motion 
for summary Judgment and having entered its Summary Judgment 
dated November 3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff 
with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint 
to "add a cause of action against the defendant, Robert Graham, 
based upon a theory of common law negligence in supplying 
intoxicating liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel." 
A proposed amended complaint was not presented with the 
motion, but counsel for plaintiff presented argument as to the 
basis for the amended complaint. 
Having reviewed the motion, and the memorandum in 
opposition to the same, and having heard the argument of counsel 
together with the procedural posture of the case, with the court 
having previously dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and the 
court having indicated at the time of the hearing that if it is 
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to 
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that 
there is not a common law cause of action running in favor of a 
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol, nor does 
the court believe that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act afford to the plaintiff a cause of action 
under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, it 
is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
2-
p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion to Amend Complaint i s deniecL. 




hereby certify that on this 3c ^ day of /7l/i.x,^J^ 
1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Erik M. Ward 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Lynn S. Pavies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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